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Abstract
We show that team formation can serve as an implicit commitment device
to overcome problems of self-control. If individuals have present-biased pref-
erences, effort that is costly today but rewarded at some later point in time
is too low from the perspective of an individual’s long-run self. If agents in-
teract repeatedly and can monitor each other, a relational contract involving
teamwork can help to improve performance. The mutual promise to work
harder is credible because the team breaks up after an agent has not kept this
promise – which leads to individual underproduction in the future and hence
a reduction of future utility.
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Remember teamwork begins by building
trust. And the only way to do that is to
overcome our need for invulnerability.
Patrick Lencioni, The Five Dysfunctions of
a Team: A Leadership Fable
1 Introduction
Teams are formed in all kinds of circumstances. They can be found within firms
to address complicated problems (almost all US firms use teams in one form or the
other (Lazear and Shaw, 2007)). Lawyers or doctors form partnerships. Potential
entrepreneurs start a firm with friends instead of pursuing their ideas alone. Due
to its importance, economists have widely analyzed teamwork, mainly focussing on
two conflicting aspects. On the one hand, technological benefits and specialization
render teamwork necessary in situations that involve complex or risky tasks. On the
other hand, teamwork is associated with a free-rider problem. Because the team’s
common goal is a public good, an underprovision of contributions can result (see
Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). Starting with Holmstrom (1982) – who shows in a
static setting that the first-best is impossible to reach if a balanced-budget rule is
imposed – the literature has tried to identify ways to overcome this public-good
problem. More recently, non-technological benefits of teamwork have come into
focus. For example, mutual monitoring and peer pressure can foster cooperation
within a team and consequently increase productivity (see Kandel and Lazear, 1992
or Baron and Kreps, 1999).
Our paper derives another inherent benefit of teams: Driven by repeated interaction
and mutual monitoring, teamwork can help to overcome problems of self-control.
If individuals have present-biased preferences, any effort that is costly today but
rewarded at some later point in time is too low from the perspective of an individual’s
long-run self. Then, agents can form a team, share the output generated by their
effort, and promise each other to work hard using a relational contract. That way,
they can improve their performance – even though the standard free-rider problem
is present, and even though teamwork renders no technological benefits. The mutual
promise to work hard is credible: after an agent has not kept his promise, the team
breaks up, and the agent is again alone with his self-control problems.
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More precisely, we propose an infinite-horizon model with two present-biased agents
who can repeatedly work on individual projects. Since production is costly today
but rewards are realized one period later, an agent works less hard than he would
prefer from the perspective of his long-run self. However, forming a team can serve
as an endogenous commitment device to increase individual effort levels – provided
agents are aware of their own time-inconsistency, hence are sophisticated in the sense
of Laibson (1997) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999). In a team, agents jointly
work on a project, share potential benefits, and make a mutual promise to work
hard. Since effort is not verifiable but can only be observed by one’s team-mate,
the promise to work hard in a team has to be credible. There, an agent faces the
following trade-off. On the one hand, he has an incentive to deviate – by slacking off
because of his present bias, but also by contributing nothing to the team, free-ride
on the other agent’s effort, and instead work on an individual project. On the other
hand, such a deviation is followed by a reversion to individual production in all sub-
sequent periods. This is costly for the agent because future effort under individual
production is regarded too low from an agent’s present perspective. Therefore, a
deviation entails current gains but future losses. The agent only sticks to the team
arrangement if the difference between future utilities obtained in a team and future
utilities from individual production is sufficiently large (from today’s perspective).
This difference depends on the standard discount factor as well as on an agent’s
present bias. If the standard discount factor is large enough, that is, if the future is
rather valuable, the efficient effort level (from the perspective of earlier periods) can
be implemented in a team. The effect of an agent’s present bias on his incentive to
stick to the team agreement is twofold. On the one hand, more severe self-control
problems reinforce discounting and consequently increase the incentive to deviate.
On the other hand, more severe self-control problems mitigate an agent’s incentive
to deviate because they reduce effort under individual production and consequently
future utilities after a deviation. The latter effect dominates if self-control problems
have initially been moderate. In this case, more severe self-control problems of its
members actually improve team performance.
Summing up, we show theoretically that working in a team can serve as a self-
disciplining device for individuals to overcome their self-control problems. As an
illustrative example for the validity of this result, take a scientist’s daily work on
research projects. Many distractions keep him from being focused and motivated –
in particular since most of the rewards of doing research are not realized immediately.
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There are ways to increase his commitment, like conference deadlines or tools that
temporarily block access to distracting websites. One of the most widespread remedy
to tackle motivational issues, though, is the collaboration with co-authors. Besides
making use of mutual comparative skills, spurring creativity, and plenty of other
advantages, such a cooperation can also serve as a commitment device to overcome
self-control problems. Promises made to co-authors are motivating, in particular if
one also wants to work with them on future projects.
Concerning more systematic evidence on the role of teamwork as a self-disciplining
device, note that our argument relies on two aspects. First, the reason for entering
a team in order to use it as a commitment device lies in an agent’s self-control prob-
lems. Second, the mechanism to enforce higher effort within a team is a relational
contract between its members (in contrast to, for example, peer pressure). This rela-
tional contract requires mutual monitoring and repeated interaction (as introduced
by Che and Yoo (2001)).
Landeo and Spier (2015) provide experimental evidence for the latter. They show
that if agents work in a team, repeated interaction and mutual monitoring ce-
teris paribus (that is, for a given potential reward) lets them work harder. Bauer,
Chytilova, and Morduch (2012) provide evidence from the world of microcredit bor-
rowing that individuals might join teams to overcome problems of self control. They
conduct a series of “lab-in-the-field” experiments in South India. Participants have
the option to borrow relatively large, real stakes, either from a microcredit institu-
tion or other sources. Borrowing from a microcredit institution involves joining a
lending group, which implies joint liability (i.e., the whole group is responsible for
the loan repayment), weekly group meetings and public transactions. Being part of a
lending group hence has many properties of teamwork in our setting – the free-rider
problem, mutual monitoring and repeated interaction (repaying a loan immediately
gives access to a new, often larger, loan) – whereas borrowing from other sources
rather relates to individual production. Bauer, Chytilova, and Morduch (2012) find
that among women who borrow, those with present-biased preferences are particu-
larly likely to borrow from microcredit institutions. They argue that these findings
support the hypothesis that group-based lending might also serve as a commitment
device to overcome problems of self-control.
In a number of extensions we explore the robustness of our results. In the bench-
mark case, teamwork renders a free-rider problem but no technological benefits.
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Therefore, teamwork is not possible with time-consistent agents, because effort when
working on an individual project is already at its first-best from the perspective of
any period. If teamwork is associated with technological benefits (like economies of
scale), though – implying that also time-consistent agents would rather work within
a team than pursuing individual projects – agents with present-biased preferences
might actually perform better than agents without. This is again driven by the
lower future utilities of present-biased agents under individual production. We also
allow for agents to be partially naive with respect to their future self-control prob-
lems and to underestimate their magnitude. This makes it more difficult to enforce
team-effort because having to work on individual projects in the future is perceived
less unattractive from today’s perspective. Further extensions can be found in an
Online Appendix. There, we first derive a renegotiation-proof equilibrium, with re-
spect to a potential renegotiation of the initial agreement as well as renegotiation of
the punishment following a deviation. Second, we show that a mixed team consist-
ing of an agent with self-control problems and an agent without can be used as a
commitment device for the former agent. This only works, though, if the agent with
self-control problems provides higher effort than the one without; hence, the seem-
ingly lazier agent actually is the one without self-control problems. Third, we sketch
the implications of mutual monitoring being imperfect and show that teamwork is
also feasible in this case. Fourth, we point out that our results do not depend on
a specific functional form of the effort cost function (the results in our paper are
derived using a quadratic cost function).
We also discuss the validity of our results. There, we first approach the question
whether an agent should be able to play a relational contract not only with an-
other individual, but also with his future selves. Such games have been analyzed by
Laibson (1994) or Bernheim, Ray, and Yeltekin (2013), who characterize subgame
perfect equilibria of a game played between different selves. We argue that relational
contracts in teams not only have a larger intuitive appeal than intra-personal games
that require self-inflicted punishment, but also are better suited to prevent renego-
tiation of the initial agreement. We formally derive the latter argument, slightly
extending our model in a sense that the outside option of an agent not only is in-
dividual production, but that he also has the option to find a new partner with
whom he can form a team. Furthermore, we argue that agents are more likely to
actually punish deviations of their partners in teams than their own deviations in
intra-personal games. Reasons are that deviations are more salient in teams, and
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in particular that individuals often accept excuses for their own behavior too eas-
ily. There, we use evidence from psychology stating that a “self-serving bias” or
“attribution bias” makes individuals prone to generally accept their own excuses
(Zuckerman (1979)). To the contrary, the behavior of others is not excused that
easily, which is known as an “actor-observer bias” (Jones and Nisbett (1987, page
80)). Therefore, teamwork can also act as a commitment device to not bring up
an excuse if one did not work hard – because one knows that their counterpart will
not accept such an excuse and punish them accordingly. Second, we compare our
approach to other potential mechanisms to enforce cooperation within a team, peer
pressure and reciprocity, and discuss how those could be distinguished empirically.
There, we again have to differentiate between the reason for team formation (in our
case: an agent’s self-control problems) and the mechanism to enforce high effort
within a team (in our case: a relational contract). Peer pressure and reciprocity
rather represent mechanisms that allow to enforce high effort even in the absence
of repeated interaction. Therefore, our approach is likely to be relevant if repeated
interaction increases the performance of teams – a prediction that in the lab has
already been confirmed by Landeo and Spier (2015). Furthermore, forming a team
is always optimal in our case provided it allows to implement high effort. This does
not necessarily hold if individuals who suffer from self-control problems contemplate
forming a team – but if the mechanism to enforce high effort either is peer pressure
or reciprocity.
Related Literature. This paper contributes and relates to three strands of lit-
erature; incentives in teams and professional partnerships, present-biased prefer-
ences, and relational contracts. The optimal provision of incentives in teams has
been widely analyzed (starting with Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Holmstrom
(1982)). This literature, though, mainly assumes that teams are formed exogenously
and only joint performance schemes are feasible. More recently, a number of more
recent papers have shown that the underlying free-rider problem can be overcome
if team members are able to (partially) observe the performance of their peers and
hence form relational contracts with each other. Che and Yoo (2001) show that
given a team is formed exogenously, joint performance evaluation might be optimal
even though the principal observes individual performance signals. The resulting
free-rider problem can be overcome by mutual monitoring, repeated interaction and
a relational contract formed between agents. Kvaløy and Olsen (2006) extend Che
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and Yoo’s paper, assuming that the (imperfect) signal the principal receives is not
verifiable as well, hence the relationship between principal and agents also is gov-
erned by relational contracts. They identify instances for which relative performance
evaluation (compared to joint and independent performance evaluation) is optimal
and show that this depends on the interaction between agents’ discount factors and
their productivities. Rayo (2007) derives optimal asset ownership if a verifiable
joint performance scheme exists but relational contracts between agents are feasi-
ble.1 Whereas these articles take the existence of teams as exogenously given, the
present paper shows that the insights developed there can also be used to derive
benefits of endogenous team formation. Furthermore, unlike Che and Yoo (2001)
and subsequent papers, we do not analyze relational contracts between a principal
several agents, but assume that two identical individuals interact.
Different from the mechanism applied in our paper, the literature has identified
further instances where the endogenous formation of teams or partnerships can be
optimal. Itoh (1991) shows that teamwork may induce agents to help each other.
Bar-Isaac (2007) develops a reputational model where it can be optimal to form a
team in order to maintain reputational incentives for older workers who want to sell
a firm but whose personal reputation is not at stake anymore. Corts (2007) shows
that teamwork can help to overcome multitasking problems, by grouping tasks with
a lower and those with a higher impact on observable signals. Mukherjee and Vas-
concelos (2011) extend Corts’ model by assuming that observable signals are not
verifiable. Because teamwork requires higher maximum payments, it is also asso-
ciated with a higher reneging temptation. Hence, teamwork only works if a firm’s
discount factor is sufficiently large. More related to our paper, Battaglini, Benabou,
and Tirole (2005) illustrate how peer pressure in groups can help individuals to resist
temptation and restrain themselves – via learning about one’s own self-confidence in
relatively homogeneous groups. Extending the literature on endogenous team for-
mation, and using relational contracts between team members as well, we show that
teamwork can also enhance productivity if individuals have self-control problems.
Furthermore, we contribute to the literature on inconsistent time preferences and
1Several articles derive derive different mechanisms that may render joint performance schemes
optimal. Mohnen, Pokorny, and Sliwka (2008) and Bartling (2011) show that if players have social
preferences, their preferences for equal outcomes can channel incentives in a way to overcome the
free-rider problem. Kim and Vikander (2013) show that if teamwork has decreasing returns to
scale and relational contracts are used to motivate employees, joint-performance systems can be
optimal because they help to smooth payments over time.
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self-control problems. Strotz (1955) is the first to formalize this aspect by noting
that an individual’s discount rate between two periods might depend on the time
of evaluation. He further discusses differences between those who recognize this in-
consistency – and hence might try to bind their future selves – and those who do
not. Phelps and Pollak (1968) state that in particular growth models should take
the possibility of inconsistent time preferences into account as this affects savings.
Laibson (1997) shows that illiquid assets can serve as a commitment device to bind
future selves. O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) focus on the distinction between indi-
viduals who are aware of their time inconsistency and those who are not; they label
the former “sophisticated” and the latter “naive”.
A large amount of evidence confirms that people make decisions that are not con-
sistent over time, for example when using credit cards or signing up for health clubs
(DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2004, 2006). Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2006) con-
duct a field experiment with customers of a Philippine bank, allowing individuals to
choose a commitment device that restricts access to their savings. More than 25% of
customers opt for this device and subsequently increase their savings substantially.
More recently, experimental evidence from the field and the lab uses real-effort tasks
to directly identify self-control problems. Kaur, Kremer, and Mullainathan (2010,
2013) perform a field experiment involving full-time workers in an Indian data entry
firm. Quantity and quality of output can be easily measured, and workers receive
a piece rate. The existence of self-control problems is supported by the observation
that workers increase effort as the payday gets closer. In addition, many workers
select an offered commitment device that would be dominated for individuals with
exponential preferences. Furthermore, Augenblick, Niederle, and Sprenger (2013)
perform a real-effort task lab experiment. There, participants show a significant
present-bias as well, and many of them demand a binding commitment device if it is
offered. We contribute to this literature showing that by forming a team, individuals
can create an implicit commitment device.2 Thereby, they use the benefits of future
cooperation as a collateral to overcome self-control problems. In addition, we show
that people with present-biased preferences can actually perform better than those
2Several other implicit commitment devices to overcome self-control problems, in particular to
enforce optimal consumption and savings decisions, have been identified. Bond and Sigurdsson
(2013) show that contractual arrangements restricting an individual’s intertemporal consumption
choice can help to solve the trade-off between inducing future commitment and reacting flexibly
to stochastic and non-verifiable shocks. Basu (2011) derives a justification for so-called rotational
savings and credit associations, which many people in the developing world join. Although clearly
restricting an individual’s flexibility, they can foster commitment to accumulate savings.
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without. To our knowledge, we are the first to derive such a result. It is driven by
individuals with self-control problems being hurt more by a breakdown of teamwork.
Finally, we relate to the literature on relational contracts. Relational contracts are
implicit arrangements based on observable but non-verifiable information. Theo-
retical foundations have been laid by Bull (1987) and MacLeod and Malcomson
(1989) and later extended for the case with imperfect public monitoring by Levin
(2003). This triggered various developments of the baseline model, thereby provid-
ing many explanations for real-world phenomena. We show that adding behavioral
assumptions to a relational contracting framework can yield new and interesting
implications.
2 Basic Model – Individual Production
2.1 The Economy
Consider two risk-neutral agents i = {1, 2} who live for infinitely many periods,
t ∈ {0, 1, . . .}. Each agent has access to an inexhaustible amount of projects. At
each date, an agent chooses a total effort level et and how to allocate it among
projects (we add an index for a specific agent whenever necessary).
Each project returns V in the following period (t + 1) with probability identical
to the effort allocated to this project. The total expected return from effort et is
thus etV , independent of the concrete allocation of effort among projects. Hence, an
agent can influence his payoff in period t+1 by increasing his effort in the previous
period t. Effort leads to an immediate cost ce2t/2 at date t, with c > 0, where et
is an agent’s total effort.3 There are no technological linkages of projects across
periods. The effort spent on a project in period t does not affect the likelihood that
the project is successful in any later period. If an agent finishes one project, or
abandons it, he can start a new project.
3Hence, an agent’s effort cost and expected payoff is the same, no matter whether he just works
on one or allocates total effort among an arbitrary number of different projects. Therefore, the
number of projects an agent works on in a given period can be set to 1.
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2.2 Discounting
Agents discount future costs and future utilities in a quasi-hyperbolic way according
to Laibson (1997) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999). Utilities after t periods are
discounted with a factor βδt, with β and δ in (0; 1]. Hence, the discounted value
of a utility stream evaluated in period t is ut + β [δut+1 + δ
2ut+2 + . . .], where ut is
the agent’s period-t utility. Consequently, an agent’s preferences are dynamically
inconsistent. At date t = 0, an agent would pay βδ for a dollar at date t = 1, and
at date t = 1 he would pay βδ for a dollar at date t = 2. However, at date t = 0,
he would give up βδ2 instead of β2δ2 for a dollar at date t = 2. In addition, we
assume that agents are sophisticated in the sense that they are fully aware of their
time-inconsistency and hence take their future time-inconsistency into account when
taking actions4. Throughout the paper, we assume that there is no formal device
for an agent to commit to any specific effort level. Furthermore, to make sure that
we always have an interior solution, we assume that δV/c < 1/2.
2.3 Individual Production and Self-Control Problems
Now, we derive effort levels if agents work on their own. There, an agent decides how












However, reasoning over how much effort he wants to spend in the future, an agent
would come to a different result. Thinking at date t how much he wants to work at
4We analyze the case of partially naive agents below, in Section 4.2.
5From a formal point of view, one could also consider an agent playing a game with his future
selves, conditioning current actions on past behavior. Here, we exclude such intra-personal games
and refer to Section 5.1 for a discussion of those.
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Informally speaking, the agent is lazy. Since eI < eFB for β < 1, he works less than
he would originally have liked to work from the perspective of earlier periods. This
does not come as a surprise, though, since the agent is sophisticated and fully aware
of his self-control problem.
This time-inconsistency problem is not present in period t = 0, the first period
of the game. There, no past plans do yet exist from which current behavior can
deviate. Hence, first-best effort in period t = 0 is equal to eI. This phenomenon –
that optimal behavior in period t = 0 differs from optimal behavior in all subsequent
periods – will also be manifest in the description of equilibrium team arrangements.
3 Teamwork
In this section, we discuss exactly the same economic setting as before. The only
difference is that – instead of working on their own – agents can form a team at
the beginning of every period. This implies that both agents jointly work on some
projects, and that the payoff V from these projects – if successful – is shared equally.
Equivalently to footnote 3, the number of projects pursued in a team at each date
can – without loss of generality – be set to 1. Agents make their effort choices
simultaneously, where effort is mutually observable but not verifiable. Given agent
1 chooses effort e1,t and agent 2 chooses e2,t, the joint expected payoff – realized in
period t + 1 – is (e1,t + e2,t)V , and each expects to receive (e1,t + e2,t)V/2. Hence,
we assume that there are no economies (or diseconomies) of scale (or scope) from
teamwork6 – the same amount of work can get done and costs of effort are the same.
6In Section 4.1, we introduce economies of scale in a team.
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Even after agents have formed a team in a period t, they are always able to revert to
individual production, in period t as well as in all future periods. This implies that
we rule out exclusivity contracts where agents commit to profit-sharing agreements
involving all of an agent’s potential projects.
Our definition of teamwork – that agents jointly work on a project – is solely made
for concreteness. Any arrangement where one agent uses his effort in order to benefit
the other agent would yield the same qualitative results. Hence, our mechanism can
also be applied to settings that go beyond a narrow definition of teamwork. For
example, one agent might directly spend some of his working time on one of the
other agent’s projects, and vice versa. Agents could also focus on different topics
and explain their insights to each other. Plain profit sharing would also be feasible,
as well as any combination of these aspects (like sharing the outputs of two projects
and alternate working on it).
3.1 Relational Contracts and Equilibrium Concept
Agents can form a relational contract specifying effort levels within the team. Since
both agents can observe each other’s effort, mutual monitoring is feasible. This
relational contract is formed at the beginning of the game. For any period t, it
specifies the actions both agents are supposed to take along the whole path of the
game – contingent on the realized history up to period t. The relational contract
implicitly determines when a team is supposed to be formed, as well as each agent’s
effort level on and off the equilibrium path. Both agents’ contingent action plans,
i. e. their strategies, have to be optimal for any feasible history, i. e., form a subgame
perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game. However, given agents’ time inconsistency,
we require a subgame perfect equilibrium to constitute a Nash equilibrium at each
subgame, given agents’ preferences once a respective subgame is reached, and given
each agent’s continuation play.
As explained above, the time-inconsistency problem does not exist in period t = 0
(there, first-best effort is identical to eI). Thus, teams can only potentially add
value in periods t ≥ 1. For those periods, relational contracts can be stationary,
i. e., team-effort is the same in every period,7 allowing us to omit time subscripts.
7This is because agents are risk-neutral and actions are mutually observed.
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3.2 Team Production
Assume each agent is supposed to exert team-effort eT in a period t. For tractability,
we focus on symmetric equilibria where effort eT is the same among agents. To ex-
plore whether team-effort eT can be enforced, we have to specify what happens after
a deviation. In principle, there are two possibilities for an agent to deviate. First,
an agent could refuse to form a team-project as specified by the relational contract.
Second, after forming the team, the agent could provide an effort level different
from eT. The first possibility to deviate, though, is not relevant: Because an agent
can always work on his own projects, agreeing to form a team but then choosing
eT = 0 is always possible. Therefore, we can restrict our attention to deviations from
equilibrium team-effort eT. Given any such deviation, we follow Abreu (1988) who
shows that any observable deviation should be responded by the strongest feasible
punishment. In our case, that means that cooperation within the relational contract
breaks down for good, and agents resume to individual production.
In the following we analyze whether such a relational contract can be sustained as
a subgame perfect equilibrium, and in particular whether team effort eT can exceed
the effort level of individual production, eI or might even reach eFB – the first-best
effort as regarded from the perspective of earlier periods. There, note that eFB also
is an agent’s preferred symmetric future effort level given a team has been formed:
In a period t and contemplating about the preferred effort levels at a future date


















which is solved by eFB. Once a team has been formed and given agents stick to their
agreement, an agent’s expected discounted utility stream in a period t ≥ 1 is

























eT can only be enforced by a relational contract if a deviation is never optimal.
Because an agent only gets 0.5 of the outcome of his own effort within the team
and because any deviation triggers a breakdown of future cooperation, if the agent
deviates, he should optimally provide zero team-effort and instead completely work
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on an individual project. Thereby he would free-ride on the other agent’s team
effort. After a deviation, both agents work on individual projects from then on.8




































To sustain teamwork, an agent’s on-path utility stream within the team has to be
larger than after a deviation. Hence, an incentive compatibility (IC) constraint must
































Here, the first line captures the standard free-rider problem of teamwork and is
negative; the second line gives the value of future cooperation, evaluated today.
Only if the second line dominates, teamwork is feasible. If (IC) is not satisfied, no
team is formed, and both agents have utilities U I.
Note that the (IC) constraint must hold in every period t. This implies that –
different from many other (formal) commitment devices analyzed in the literature
– teamwork has to be optimal for every future self of an agent (taking every future
self’s continuation utility into account), not only for the period-0 self.
3.3 Results
We now analyze what can be achieved within a team and what is not feasible,
without making any claim which equilibrium is actually chosen (with the exception
that we focus on symmetric equilibria). As a first result, we can show that if agents
do not exhibit inconsistent time preferences, forming a team is not feasible.
8If the team cannot be dissolved, for example because the team is an entity within a firm, then
agents would play the static equilibrium, yielding an even worse utility than individual production.
We discuss this possibility below, in Section 6.
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Lemma 1 For β = 1, no positive effort level can be enforced within a team.
Obviously, a team is not needed if β = 1. We show that forming a team even is not
possible in that case. This is driven by two aspects. On the one hand, the standard
free-rider problem of team production is present, making an underprovision of effort
optimal in the short run. On the other hand, an agent’s outside option is already
at the first best. Hence, a breakdown of the team is associated with no costs and
a deviation always more tempting than working on the joint project. Furthermore,
teamwork is only (potentially) feasible for effort levels strictly above eI.
Lemma 2 No effort level eT ≤ eI can be enforced within a team.
The intuition of Lemma 2 is similar to the one driving Lemma 1. For eT ≤ eI,
continuation utilities of individual production are higher than those of teamwork.
Together with the free-rider problem, this indicates that teamwork is not only not
worthwhile, but not even feasible for eT ≤ eI. Lemma 2 also implies that if a team
can be formed, this is optimal for both agents; because the associated effort is higher
than eI, teamwork can help them to overcome their self-control problems.
In a next step, we show that forming a team is indeed feasible for β < 1 and that
first-best effort eFB might eventually be reached if δ is sufficiently large.
Proposition 1 For every β < 1 and any effort level eT ∈ (eI, eFB], eT can be
enforced within a team if δ is sufficiently close to 1.
For δ sufficiently large, today’s value of future cooperation becomes so large that it
necessarily dominates today’s gain of a deviation. Proposition 1 establishes our first
main result – that teamwork can help to overcome self-control problems. The next
proposition makes the feasibility of teamwork more precise.
Proposition 2 Positive effort within a team can be enforced if and only if
δ ≥ δ ≡
2
√
4− 6β + 3β2 − 1
5− 8β + 4β2
. (8)
Furthermore, dδ/dβ ≥ 0.
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To obtain δ, we derive the level of team-effort that maximizes the left-hand-side
of the (IC) constraint, denoted eT. Since it is unique, teamwork is only feasible if
the (IC) constraint holds for eT. Two aspects are important. First of all, δ < 1 for
β < 1, hence agents with self-control problems can generally form productive teams.
Furthermore, dδ/dβ ≥ 0 implies that a lower β generally makes it easier to enforce
any effort within a team.
The latter point is not that straightforward, since a lower β generally has two coun-
tervailing effects. On the one hand, it reduces eI and an agent’s outside option,
thereby relaxing the (IC) constraint. On the other hand, the future becomes less
valuable, which tightens the (IC) constraint. However, at the threshold δ only effort
eT can just be enforced, which is increasing in β (furthermore, eT → 0 for β → 0).
Therefore, a lower β implies that the critical threshold of δ above which a team can
be formed is reduced, however the enforceable effort at this threshold goes down.
The grey line in Figure 1 below gives δ as a function of β; the shaded region above
gives all combinations of δ and β for which positive effort within a team can be
enforced.
We are particularly interested in the conditions for which first-best effort eFB = δV/c
can be enforced. In this case, the (IC) constraint becomes
− (1− β (1− β)) + δ
(
1− β2 (1− β)
)
≥ 0. (9)
Since the term δ2V 2/2c cancels out, the value of the fundamentals V and c has no
effect on the enforceability of team-effort. Only the ratio V 2/c determines the size
of the left hand side, however does not affect whether it is positive. This implies
Proposition 3 First-best effort eFB within a team can be enforced if
δ ≥ δFB ≡ (1− β (1− β)) /
(
1− β2 (1− β)
)
. (10)
Note that δFB < 1 for β ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore, δFB increases in β for large ini-
tial values of β and decreases for small initial values of β.9 Therefore, more severe
self-control problems of team members can make it easier to sustain first-best effort












within a team. Again, this is driven by the two effects of a lower β on the en-
forceability of a given effort level eT. A lower β not only amplifies discounting and
therefore directly tightens the (IC) constraint, it also relaxes the (IC) constraint by
decreasing off-equilibrium individual effort levels in the future ( i. e., eI is reduced)
and consequently agents’ outside options from today’s perspective. Starting from
β = 1 and reducing β, the second effect initially dominates if eT = eFB. For rather
low values of β, the first effect dominates.
In the following Figure 1, the blue line gives δFB, and the grey region above shows
all combinations of δ and β for which eFB can be enforced.
Figure 1: Region Where Positive Effort and the First-Best can be Attained










Note: The lower curve gives δ as defined in Proposition 2. Above this curve, positive effort in
a team is feasible. The upper curve gives δFB as defined in Proposition 3. Above this curve, a
relational contract can implement the first-best effort level.
Concluding, more severe self-control problems can help to improve the performance
of a team (which – if feasible – always yields higher effort than eI, see Lemma 2).
This is a general feature of relational contracts, which work better if agents are
vulnerable. Someone who is locked in a relationship because their outside option
is unattractive is willing to sacrifice more in order to maintain cooperation. An
agent’s vulnerability might be more pronounced if finding an adequate replacement
for one’s partner is impossible or – as in our case – if being thrown back on one’s
own is particularly bad.
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4 Extensions
In the following, we extend our setup along two lines and show that a couple of
further interesting results can be obtained.10 First, we assume that teamwork is as-
sociated with exogenous technological benefits. Second, we explore the implications
of agents not being (fully) aware of their future self-control problems.
4.1 Teamwork with Exogenous Benefits
We have shown that teamwork can help to overcome an agent’s self-control problems.
For time-consistent agents, teamwork is not possible – however also not needed.
Here, we show that even if teamwork renders technological benefits, implying that
also time-consistent agents would rather work within a team than on individual
projects, time-inconsistent agents can perform better than time-consistent ones.
This is true as long as the exogenous benefits of teamwork are not too large. The
mechanism driving this result is equivalent to the one underlying our previous anal-
ysis: A lower β not only reduces continuation utilities on the equilibrium path, but
also agents’ off-path utilities. As long as the latter aspect dominates, a lower β can
induce a higher performance within the team.
We focus on one particular case of exogenous team benefits and assume that if both
agents work on a joint project, the probability to generate the payoff V in period t+1
is e1 + e2 + 2αmin{e1, e2}, with α ≥ 0 (and impose the assumption δV (1 + α)/c <
1/2 to always guarantee an interior solution). We use the minimum-function in
order to make sure that the exogenous benefits of teamwork are only realized if
both actually work on the joint project. Other specifications for the exogenous
benefits of teamwork would generate very similar results. A value α = 0 yields the
situation analyzed above; a value α > 0 could be generated by discussions of the
team members about the joint problems which deepens each agent’s understanding,
or by heterogeneities in the agents’ abilities to tackle different aspects of a project. If
both agents exert team effort eT, the probability to generate the payoff V in period
t+ 1 is 2eT(1 + α).
Before analyzing the feasibility of teamwork, we have to be precise about the defi-
10Further extensions can be found in an Online Appendix.
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nition of first-best effort in this section. First-best effort – as regarded from earlier
periods – now is different under individual production than within a team. Here,
we focus on the highest feasible payoff an agent can possibly expect, which implies
that the technological benefits of teamwork are enjoyed. Hence, we define first-best
effort levels eFB1 and e
FB








+ δ (e1 + e2 + 2αmin{e1, e2})V. (11)
Since a potential output V is shared equally, no other definition of first-best effort
could make both agents better off. The symmetric first-best effort level eFB is thus
eFB =
δ (1 + α)V
c
. (12)














Individual production still constitutes agents’ outside options11 and is not affected
by the existence of technological team benefits. It yields a per-period utility uI =
−c (eI)2/2 + βδeIV , and optimal effort for each agent is eI = βδV/c.

















































11Note that, if the exogenous team benefits are large enough (more precisely, if α ≥ 1), then
there also are static Nash equilibria where agents team up. The largest feasible punishment can be
achieved (and hence maximizes equilibrium utilities, see Abreu (1988)), though, if any deviation is
followed by a reversion to the static Nash equilibrium with lowest utility levels, that is, individual
production.
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Generally, a larger α helps to enforce cooperation within a team, irrespective of
whether agents have a present bias or not. Hence, a larger α lets potential extra
benefits of a lower β diminish. As long as α is not too large, though, the perfor-
mance of teams with time-inconsistent agents can be better than of teams without
inconsistencies. To see that, we focus on first-best effort eFB and the conditions
under which it can be enforced. For eFB, the (IC’) constraint becomes
− (1 + α)2 − β2 + β (1 + α) (2α + 1) + δ
(
(1 + α)2 − β (1 + α)α− β2 (1− β)
)
≥ 0,
and first-best effort is feasible for
δ ≥ δ
′FB ≡
(1 + α)2 + β2 − β (1 + α) (2α + 1)
[
(1 + α)2 − αβ (1 + α)− β2 (1− β)
] . (14)
As an example, assume that α = 0.05, i. e. teamwork boosts total productivity by 5
% compared to individual production. Then, the blue line in the following Figure 2
gives δ
′FB as a function of β; the grey region above gives all combinations of δ
and β for which eFB can be enforced for α = 0.05. Furthermore, for the sake of
comparability, the grey line gives δ
′
– the threshold above which any positive effort
can be enforced in a team – and the shaded region above all combinations of δ and
β for which this is the case for α = 0.05.12
Figure 2: Region Where Positive Effort/the First-Best can be Attained, α = 0.05










Note: The lower curve gives δ′ for α = 0.05. Above this curve, positive effort in a team is feasible.
The upper curve gives δ
′
FB as defined in Equation (14). Above this curve, a relational contract
can implement the first-best effort level.
Hence, there exist values of δ such that first-best effort cannot be enforced when













β = 1, but that this is feasible for values β < 1.
Concluding, even in the presence of exogenous technological benefits of teamwork,
teams of agents with self-control problems can perform better than teams of agents
without – however only if α is not too large. The following Figure 3 gives δ
′FB for
general values of α. The region above the curve shows all combinations of δ, β and
α for which eFB can be enforced.
Figure 3: Region Where the First-Best can be Attained, General α
Note: Above the surface, the first-best can be attained. The blue curve stands for α = 0, hence it
coincides with the blue curve of Figure 1. The purple curve stands for α = 0.05, hence it coincides
with the purple curve of Figure 2. The slope with respect to α is negative, which means that with
positive technological benefits from teamwork, it is easier to reach the first-best with the help of a
relational contract.
4.2 Naive and Partially Naive Agents
The agents in our setup are sophisticated in a sense that they can perfectly anticipate
their future self-control problems and hence their future behavior. In this section,
we extend our model and also allow for (partially) naive agents in the sense of
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001): An agent’s actual self control problems in every
period are characterized by β. An agent’s belief concerning his self-control problems
in all future periods, though, is given by β̂, with β ≤ β̂ ≤ 1. Previously, we had
β̂ = β. A fully naive agent has β̂ = 1 and believes that he is going to have no
self-control problems in the future. A partially naive agent has β̂ ∈ (β, 1) and is
aware of having self-control problems in the future, but underestimates their degree.
20
To keep the analysis simple, we assume β and β̂ to remain constant over time and
exclude learning. Hence, although an agent’s true β is the same in every period,
he thinks that the value in future periods is β̂. This has a direct impact on an
agent’s perceptions of future individual production. Although he would choose effort
eI = βδV/2 in every period working on his own, he expects to work harder in the
future and then choose êI = β̂δV/c ≥ eI. Therefore, it becomes more difficult to
































Whereas the first line is unaffected by an agent’s belief concerning his future self-
control problems, the second line is reduced – because having to work on individual
projects in the future (incorrectly) seems to be less unattractive for partially naive
agents. In the extreme case of fully naive agents (β̂ = 1), no team-effort at all can
be enforced, for the same reason that made teamwork impossible for agents without
self-control problems (Lemma 1): Because agents expect to exert first-best effort if
working on their own in the future, they perceive a breakdown of the team to be
costless. All this implies that teamwork is in principle feasible with partially naive
agents; however, a larger degree of naiveté (a higher β̂) makes cooperation within
teams more difficult to sustain.
5 Discussion
In this section, we assess the general validity of our results. First, we discuss whether
an agent should be able to play a relational contract not only with another individual,
but also with his future selves. Second, we compare our approach to other potential




From a formal point of view, the relational contract we propose could also be formed
by an individual agent playing a game with his future selves, conditioning current
actions on past behavior. Such games have been analyzed by Laibson (1994) or Bern-
heim, Ray, and Yeltekin (2013), who allow for “personal rules” which are formally
characterized by subgame perfect equilibria of the game played between different
selves (note that this is different from widely-analyzed situations where the current
self restricts a future self’s choice set, which is not feasible in our setting). However,
we think that Markov perfect equilibria have a larger intuitive appeal when ana-
lyzing intra-personal decision making (like in Krusell and Anthony A. Smith (2003)
or Basu (2011)). In the following, we also make two more substantive arguments
to support our view that relational contracts in teams are better suited to tackle
self-control problems than intra-personal rules that require self-inflicted punishment.
First, we present a formal argument for why renegotiation can better be prevented
in teams than in an arrangement an agent has with himself. Second, we argue
that agents are more likely to punish deviations of other agents than deviations of
themselves – because in the latter case, they too easily accept excuses for their own
behavior and because deviations are more salient.
5.1.1 Renegotiation
Due to inconsistent time preferences, players would at a given point in time benefit
from renegotiating their agreement and postpone high effort to the next period. This
kind of renegotiation would be deemed optimal in every period, hence potentially
make cooperation within a team or an accordingly designed intra-personal game
entirely infeasible. We argue that a team can do better to prevent such renegotiation
than an individual can do himself.
First, the relational contract might be adjusted accordingly: At the beginning of
the game, both agree that any attempt to renegotiate the agreement later on is
regarded a deviation and triggers a separation. Although this aspect can of course
also be subject to renegotiation, we would argue that renegotiation attempts shape
expectations that this will happen over and over again. But cooperation in a team
only works of no one expects a renegotiation of the agreement in the future, therefore
individuals might abstain from renegotiation in order to not affect expectations on
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future behavior. An individual, on the other hand, can arbitrarily adjust his plans
at any point in time and do what currently seems optimal (as we argue in the next
section, a deviation in an intra-personal game is less salient than within a team).
Put differently, being in a team implies that any action implies a reaction – and this
reaction depends on whether behavior has previously been agreed-upon or not.
Second, we can make a more formal argument and characterize an equilibrium that
prevents any renegotiation attempts even if those are not punished by a surplus-
reducing permanent reversion to individual production. We provide a full char-
acterization of this equilibrium in the Online Appendix, here we just sketch its
properties and argue that it does not work for intra-personal games. To establish an
equilibrium that prevents on-path renegotiation (that is, renegotiation of the initial
agreement; renegotiation of an off-path punishment is also analyzed in the respective
section of the Online Appendix), we have to adjust the model setup in one dimen-
sion: The outside option is not necessarily individual production anymore; instead,
players are able to find new partners with whom they can form a team.
Equilibrium play in a new team is designed in a way that for a given team, high
effort can be enforced in every period and on-path renegotiation does not occur.
The equilibrium has the properties that renegotiation triggers a termination in the
subsequent period. This termination threat must be costly from today’s perspec-
tive in order to prevent renegotiation attempts. Furthermore, it must be optimal
from tomorrow’s perspective if renegotiation has occurred, but not otherwise. This
latter aspect implies that a termination does not make any agent worse off at the
time when this decision is made and hence is renegotiation-proof. Therefore, at
the beginning of a period, agents have to be indifferent between staying in their
current relationship and going for a new match. All this is obtained by letting new
matches start with a number of periods with individual production and move to
high effort thereafter. The number of periods with individual production is found
by equalizing an agent’s utility of remaining in his current match (and continuing
with high effort) with an agent’s utility of a separation (also taking into account that
he might not immediately find a new match). Furthermore, an agent’s inconsistent
time preferences imply that from today’s perspective, he strictly prefers high team
effort from tomorrow on. Therefore, such an equilibrium can prevent attempts for
a renegotiation of the initial agreement. Furthermore, we assume that equilibrium
play in new matches can also be contingent on past free-riding in order to prevent
the latter. This requires some transparency in a sense that prospective new partners
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are aware of an agent’s past deviations.
Such an equilibrium that prevents on-path renegotiation can not be sustained if
everyone plays an intra-personal game to sustain high effort because it requires the
opportunity to go for a new relationship. In an intra-personal game, an individual
rather has the opportunity to renegotiate any agreement with himself, leading to a
constant delay of high effort.
5.1.2 Punishment is More Likely in Teams
In intra- as well as interpersonal arrangements, effort above eI can only be imple-
mented if deviations are deterred. Those can take the form of free-riding, but also –
as discussed in the previous section – of renegotiation attempts to postpone delivery
of high effort. Any deviation must be regarded a violation of the agreement and
be punished adequately (where a punishment can also mean that a team breaks up
and its members go for new matches, as analyzed in the previous section). Whereas
identifying a deviation is straightforward in our model, the situation is less clear in
many real-word situations. In particular, individuals sometimes do have valid ex-
cuses for postponing high effort – may it be for private reasons or because of other
jobs that have to be done – and a punishment only seems justified if an excuse is
not regarded valid. However, the validity of excuses can be subject to interpreta-
tion.13 In psychology, for example, there is evidence that a “self-serving bias” or
“attribution bias” makes individuals prone to generally accept their own excuses.
Such a bias has been explained by Zuckerman (1979), who reports the notion that
individuals “attempt to enhance or protect their self-esteem by taking credit for
success and denying responsibility for failure” (p. 245). Moreover, individuals at-
tribute positive outcomes to inherent personality traits, whereas negative outcomes
are caused by situational influences (see Moskowitz (2005), or Forsyth (2008) among
many others).14
13Although these aspects have a flavor of games with incomplete or asymmetric information
(which we analyze in the Online Appendix), a potential ambiguity when assessing the validity of
an excuse addresses a different dimension.
14As examples for empirical evidence, take Lau and Russell (1980), who show that members of
sports teams are much more likely to attribute success internally than losses; or Stewart (2005),
who analyzes a survey completed by survivors of motor vehicle crashes. In particular people
who were involved in more severe crashes put responsibility on other drivers or road/weather
conditions. In economics, such an attribution bias has only received limited attention. An exception
is Hestermann and Le Yaouanq (2016), who show that overconfidence concerning one’s own ability
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In our case, such a self-serving bias would imply that whenever someone realizes
that they have not worked as hard as intended, they rather blame factors outside
their own responsibility – and therefore do not see a need to “punish” themselves
after a deviation. If this is (subliminally) anticipated by individuals, performance is
negatively affected.
The situation is different when someone else’s behavior is assessed, which has been
regarded as an “actor-observer bias”. Jones and Nisbett (1987, page 80), for exam-
ple, provide the following definition:15 “The actor’s view of his behavior emphasizes
the role of environmental conditions at the moment of action. The observer’s view
emphasizes the causal role of stable dispositional properties of the actor. We wish
to argue that there is a pervasive tendency for actors to attribute their actions to
situational requirements, whereas observers tend to attribute the same actions to
stable personal dispositions.”
Therefore, teamwork can also act as a commitment device to not bring up an excuse
if one did not work hard, because one knows that their counterpart will not accept
the excuse and punish them accordingly.
Finally, we argue that deviations in a team are more salient than deviations in an
intra-personal game: In the former case, a deviation either means one agent free-
riding on the other agent’s effort (implying a clear violation of the agreement), or a
renegotiation of the relational contract. Then, one agent effectively has to approach
the other agent to suggest postponing high effort. In an intra-personal game, both
kinds of deviations just boil down to exerting a different effort level than intended,
which can rather be shrugged off by individuals. Therefore, deviations are more
salient in a team, which we argue implies that those are more likely to be punished
in real-world situations.
5.2 Comparisons and Predictions
We have shown that even if teamwork renders no technological benefits, the associ-
ated relational contract can help overcome problems of self control. Naturally, we do
can lead to an attribution bias.
15For further explorations of the actor-observer bias see Moskowitz (2005), Forsyth (2008), who
also explore the actor-observer bias and provide explanations for its foundation.
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not claim that our mechanism is the sole reason for the formation and functioning
of teams. Still, in order to assess its real-word relevance, it is important to lay out
how our approach can be distinguished from other potential drivers.
In this section, we analyze two other potential forces that might increase effort in
teams – peer pressure and reciprocity – and discuss to what extent those would yield
different predictions (that could in principle be tested in lab or field experiments)
than ours. We focus on these two because they appear rather related. Other reasons
for an endogenous formation of teams, for example the existence of multitasking
problems (Corts (2007)), work under entirely different settings, and the differences
to our concept appear evident.
Before relating peer pressure and reciprocity to our approach, let us first be more
precise about their meaning. With both, preferences are assumed to entail “social”
elements that foster cooperation. Peer pressure as a means to address free-rider
problems has (at least in economics) been introduced by Kandel and Lazear (1992).
They assume that each individual’s utility function also contains a peer pressure
term that depends on one’s own as well as on others’ actions. Effort reduces peer
pressure, which creates additional incentives to exert effort. Peer pressure works
via guilt or shame: Guilt is an internal mechanism and does not require mutual
monitoring, whereas shame can only emerge once free riding is detected by others.
Preferences for reciprocity (see Akerlof (1982), Falk and Fischbacher (2006), or En-
glmaier and Leider (2012)) make individuals also care about their peers’ utilities –
provided those have acted to one’s own benefit. In a team, effort has a public goods
component. Therefore, an agent’s effort might increase the other’s utility – who
then wants to reciprocate by working harder, and vice versa.
Now, when comparing various approaches, one has to differentiate between a ratio-
nale for team formation and the mechanism to enforce high effort within a team and
overcome the free-rider problem. In our setting, both aspects are relevant: The ra-
tionale for forming a team is to overcome problems of self control. Given it has been
formed, effort is enforced by repeated-game incentives, that is, a relational contract
between team members (see Che and Yoo, 2001). But also the very existence of
self-control problems helps to enforce team effort – because those reduce each play-
ers’ outside option in case punishment means a reversion to individual production.
This integral perspective on the formation and functioning of teams is not shared
by models of peer pressure or reciprocity (or other concepts we are aware of). These
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mechanisms are supposed to help enforce high effort, taking the existence of the
team as granted.
Given a team has been formed, our concept differs from peer pressure and reciprocity
in a sense that both also work in a static setting. One might therefore compare team
effort in a static setting with team effort in a setting with repeated interaction. Ce-
teris paribus higher effort in the second case would indicate that relational contracts
indeed help to overcome free-rider problems. Landeo and Spier (2015) provide ex-
perimental evidence for this conjecture. They let agents work in teams and show
that repeated interaction and mutual monitoring ceteris paribus makes them work
harder.
Furthermore, even if we assume that individuals suffer from self-control problems,
and if they have the option to form a team, outcomes might differ depending on
whether the mechanism to enforce high effort is a relational contract, or whether it
is peer pressure or reciprocity:
Whereas our mechanism always makes it optimal to form a team (given this is
feasible; see the discussion following Lemma 2), this does not necessarily hold with
peer pressure. Peer pressure produces higher effort levels, but the pressure itself is
a cost that has to be borne by team members. Therefore, if peer pressure is high in
a team, agents might rather work on individual projects with lower effort – because
they feel badly about being in an arrangement with substantial peer pressure (see
Lazear and Shaw (2007)).
The situation is less straightforward with reciprocity, for the following reason: Re-
ciprocal preferences create additional utility if effort is above a certain benchmark (a
“warm-glow” effect as in Akerlof (1982) or Englmaier and Leider (2012)), or negative
utility if effort is below such a threshold (see Falk and Fischbacher (2006)).
As an example (which is similar to Falk and Fischbacher (2006) and Englmaier













, where η ≥ 0 is a reciprocity parameter and e the benchmark
effort level.16 If e is rather low (and η sufficiently high), team-effort would easily be
above the benchmark, induce effort levels above eI and furthermore create additional
16To be fully precise, uT
1
is defined as a function of agent 1’s beliefs about agent 2’s team effort
(since effort choices are made simultaneously), which however coincide with agent 2’s exerted effort
on the equilibrium path.
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utility via the reciprocity term. In this case, forming a team might even be optimal
for time-consistent agents in order to enjoy the associated warm glow – a result that
could not be generated by our model (see Lemma 1). If e is rather high, on the
other hand, the situation would be rather similar to a model of peer pressure. Then,
if eT is below the benchmark, having a team is associated with a utility loss. If this
utility loss is too high in relation to the increase in effort levels, agents rather work
on individual projects.
As a final difference that can potentially be assessed empirically, recall that the per-
formance of a relational contract generally decreases with an agent’s outside option.
Therefore, more severe self-control problems might actually improve team perfor-
mance – an outcome that could not be generated with peer pressure or reciprocity.
6 Conclusion
We have shown that teamwork can serve as an implicit commitment device to over-
come problems of procrastination and self-control. Even if teamwork renders tech-
nological benefits, the team-performance of agents with self-control problems can
actually be better than the performance of agents without. We have focussed on a
setting with just two individuals and abstracted from standard employment situa-
tions where a principal assigns agents to jobs, and in particular has the option to
let them work individually or form a team. In such an environment, Che and Yoo
(2001) have shown that it can be optimal for a principal to let agents (without self-
control problems) work in a team – if agents interact repeatedly and can therefore
form a relational contract, if the principal can only use an imperfect performance
measure to compensate individuals, and if agents can mutually monitor each other’s
effort. Furthermore, agents are protected by limited liability, hence the principal
cannot extract high rents ex ante that she has to grant agents when incentivizing
them.
Naturally, the results derived in Che and Yoo (2001) also hold if agents have self-
control problems. In this case, the benefits of a team will be even larger than if
agents do not suffer from a present bias. Generally, mutual monitoring allows to
implement higher effort levels within a team if the standard discount factor δ is
sufficiently large. Then, provided the principal’s return to effort is larger than the
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agents’ return V (which in this case might represent a bonus agents receive for a
high output), she will assign agents to teams rather than letting them work on
individual projects. There, note that enforcing high effort actually becomes easier
with a principal than in the setting we have analyzed in the present paper: If agents
have to stay in the team after a deviation, their off-path utilities are reduced, which
reduces their temptation to deviate. The exact benefits of teamwork in a setting
with principal is present will however also rely on further aspects – like whether a
principal can commit to pay an output-based bonus, or whether agents are free to
leave in every period (in particular after a deviation). We think that it is worthwhile
to study these aspects in future research, and more generally address the question
of optimal workplace design for employees with self-control problems.
A Appendix – Proofs
































Now eFB maximizes δeV −ce2/2, hence
(













δeFBV − c (eFB)2/2
)
< 0. Therefore, the
left hand side of (IC) is strictly negative for any eT ≥ 0. 
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof is almost equivalent to that of Lemma 1. Assume
that eT ≤ eI. Because eI ≤ eFB and δeV − ce
2
2
is increasing for effort levels below eFB,
the second line of the (IC) constraint,
(




δeIV − c (eI)2/2
)
≤ 0
for eT ≤ eI; because eI maximizes βδeV − ce2/2 the first line of the (IC) constraint,
βδeTV/2 − c (eT)2/2 −
(
βδeIV − c (eI)2/2
)
, is strictly negative. Therefore, the left
hand side of the (IC) constraint is strictly negative for eT ≤ eI. 
Proof of Proposition 1. The second line of the (IC) constraint,
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is strictly positive for any β < 1 and eI < eT ≤ eFB. Following Lemmas 1 and 2,
the first line of the (IC) constraint is negative, however it is bounded. Hence, for
δ → 1, the (IC) constraint is satisfied for any eT with eI < eT ≤ eFB. 
Proof of Proposition 2. First, we derive the level of eT that maximizes the left-
hand-side of the (IC) constraint. Only if (IC) holds for this effort level, positive
effort within a team can at all be enforced. The first derivative of the left-hand-side

















condition holds since the second derivative of the left-hand-side of (IC) with respect
to eT equals −c1−δ+βδ
1−δ
< 0). Plugging this value into (IC) and re-arranging gives
−3 + 2δ + 5δ2 + 4βδ2 (β − 2) ≥ 0. (16)
Solving for δ yields δ =
(
− 1 + 2
√









= 2 (1− β)
17− 24β + 12β2 − 4
√
4− 6β + 3β2
√
4− 6β + 3β2 (5− 8β + 4β2)2
. (17)
The sign of dδ/dβ is determined by the sign of its numerator, where
17− 24β + 12β2 − 4
√
4− 6β + 3β2 = 1 + 4
(




4− 6β + 3β2
= 1 + 4
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3(1− β)2 + 1
]
.
Since 3 (1− β)2 + 1 ≥ 1, we have
[ (




3(1− β)2 + 1
]
≥ 0. Thus,




As with many cases of subgame-perfect equilibria in repeated games, punishing
free-riding by permanently switching to individual production afterwards is not
renegotiation-proof because both agents would benefit from re-starting the team.
This, however, would implicate adverse effects on the ex-ante incentives of antici-
pating agents. Still, such surplus-destroying off-path punishment could be supported
by the following, slightly informal, argument. An agent is only willing to contribute
to the team if he expects the other agent to do so as well. A deviation of one
agent then permanently deteriorates the other agent’s expectations that he will
contribute in the future. Consequently, any attempt for renegotiation following a
deviation would not help to regain cooperation – because both agents do not expect
their counterpart to cooperate anymore. But even if we require punishments to be
renegotiation-proof, we show below that teamwork can nevertheless be sustained.
Moreover, there also is an opportunity for mutually beneficial renegotiation on the
equilibrium path in our setting. In any period t, both players would be better off
at this point in time by renegotiating their agreement, work on individual projects
today and resume teamwork from the next period on. Since renegotiation would
be deemed optimal in every period, it would potentially make cooperation within a
team entirely infeasible.
This dilemma is caused by inconsistent time preferences. We argue that teamwork
is a mechanism to overcome the associated commitment problem, for example by
adjusting the relational contract accordingly: At the beginning of the game, both
agree that any attempt to renegotiate the agreement later on is regarded a deviation
and triggers a separation. Of course, this part of the agreement can also be subject
to renegotiation. But then, we can refer to the above-mentioned argument using
expectations on future behavior: Cooperation in a team only works if no one expects
a renegotiation of the agreement in the future. Being approached by one’s partner
to renegotiate the agreement (and agreeing to it) could then induce expectations
that this will happen over and over again – and prevent renegotiation in the first
place.
We think that this argument has a lot of intuitive appeal. However, one might
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also argue that initiating a renegotiation is fundamentally different from free-riding.
Whereas the latter is a clear deviation of the agreement at the expense of one’s
counterpart, renegotiation can result in a jointly beneficial change of the contrac-
tual terms. Therefore, one might claim that renegotiation should not trigger the
same kind of punishment as free-riding does. But then, agents would have incen-
tives to repeatedly renegotiate their agreement and consequently not be able to
sustain higher effort. In the following, we show that if an attempt for renegotiation
is not considered a deviation that is supposed to be punished by a surplus-reducing
permanent reversion to individual production, high effort within a team can nev-
ertheless be sustained if our setup is slightly extended: The outside option is not
necessarily individual production anymore; instead, players are potentially able to
find new partners with whom they can form a team. More precisely, assume that
at the beginning of every period, players decide whether they stay in their cur-
rent match, or whether they leave and look for a new one. We do not fully model
the matching market, but assume that a new match can be found with probability
γ ≤ 1.17 Before designing an equilibrium that can prevent renegotiation, note that
(for now) we still let a free-rider be punished by having to rely on individual pro-
duction thereafter. This requires some transparency in a sense that prospective new
partners are aware of an agent’s past deviations, which we assume. Below, we also
analyze renegotiation-proof punishments that do not require a complete reversion
to individual production.
Now, we construct an equilibrium that implements high team effort in every period
and therefore prevents (attempts for) on-path renegotiation. In this equilibrium, we
want renegotiation to trigger a termination in the following period. Second, a ter-
mination in the following period has to be costly from today’s perspective. But such
a termination threat must be credible (and not be subject to renegotiation as well).
Therefore, the third property of this equilibrium is that, when tomorrow comes, a
termination must be optimal if renegotiation has occurred in the previous period –
but not otherwise. This implies that a termination does not make any agent worse
off at the time when this decision is made and hence is renegotiation-proof. The fol-
lowing equilibrium has all these properties. Any new match starts with a number of
periods with individual production and moves to high effort thereafter. The number
of periods with individual production is obtained by equalizing an agent’s utility of
17For example, this could be endogenized by assuming that existing matches break up for ex-
ogenous reasons with some probability, and hence there always exist potential new partners.
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remaining in his current match (and continuing with high effort) with an agent’s
utility of a separation (taking into account that he might not immediately find a new
match). If γ is sufficiently large, such an equilibrium exists. Furthermore, because
of an agent’s self-control problems, tomorrow’s indifference between an equilibrium
with continuously high team effort, and a combination of individual production and
teamwork, implies that from today’s perspective, he strictly prefers high team-effort
from tomorrow on. Therefore, such an equilibrium can prevent attempts for renego-
tiation. Note that renegotiation to equilibria which are not maximizing the surplus
can also be prevented. For example, a team might renegotiate and agree that in-
dividual production is chosen for two periods, rendering a separation suboptimal
also from tomorrow’s perspective. This, however, could be dealt with by assuming
that a termination happens in the period where agents are supposed to resume team
production.
In the following proposition, we provide a lower bound on γ above which first-
best effort eFB in such a renegotiation-proof equilibrium can be sustained provided
δ ≥ δFB, where δFB is the discount factor above which first-best effort can be imple-
mented in our main part (see Proposition 3). There, we assume −1+ δ (1 + β) > 0,
which is equivalent to having UT > U I for eT = eFB
Proposition 4 Assume −1+ δ (1 + β) > 0. Allowing for on-path renegotation and
provided δ ≥ δFB, first-best effort eFB within a team can be enforced if
γ ≥ γ =
−1 + δ (1 + β) + β (1− δ2)
βδ (2− δ)
, (18)
with γ < 1.
Proof of Proposition 4. We are interested in an equilibrium where team-effort
eT = eFB = δV/c can be implemented in every period, which implies that renegoti-
ation does not happen on the equilibrium path. We first design new matches in a
sense that agents are indifferent between staying and going for a new match. When
staying and choosing an effort eFB, an agent’s utility equals





















In a new relationship, both agents work on their own projects for T > 1 periods. In
period T + 1, both return to teamwork with probability 1− ρ and work for another
period on their own with probability ρ. From period T + 2 onwards, they return
to teamwork forever after (note that any attempt to renegotiate this agreement is
also followed by a termination in the subsequent period). Therefore, the utility of
starting a new relationship after having found a match is










































(2− β)β + δT (1− β)2 − δTρ(1− β)2(1− δ)
1− δ
]
Given a new match is found with probability γ < 1, the utility of an unmatched
agent equals























Now, ρ and T are obtained by setting UT = Ũ , which yields






δ (β + (1− δ)) + (1− β) δT+1 (1− ρ (1− δ))
]
.
Note that, because of δ ≥ δFB, the left-hand-side is positive. It remains to show
that there exist values of ρ and T such that this condition holds. There, note that
the right-hand-side is maximized for T = ρ = 0. These values therefore give us the
smallest feasible γ such that this condition holds. For any larger γ ≤ 1, T and ρ can
be adjusted accordingly. Hence, there are ρ and T for which this condition holds, if
γ ≥ γ =




Furthermore, γ < 1 ⇔ (1− δ) (1− β) > 0. Given there is no renegotiation, the (IC)
constraint for first-best effort is the same as in our benchmark case, hence yields
δ ≥ δFB which holds by assumption. There, recall that we assume that any agent
caught free riding cannot be part of a profitable team anymore and is hence forced
to stick to individual production afterwards.
It remains to be shown that a renegotiation is never optimal. There, we distinguish
between a successful and an unsuccessful renegotiation, where in the former case
both work on individual projects for one period (before splitting up and going for
new matches). In the latter case, the renegotiation attempt is turned down and
both stick to teamwork (before splitting up and going for new matches). There,
it is sufficient to show that this holds for γ = 1. After a successful renegotiation,
an agent takes into account that the match is terminated in the subsequent period.
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.
Using −1 + δ (1 + β) = βδT+1 (1− ρ (1− δ)) (which provides indifference between













[−1 + δ (1 + β)] (1− β)2 .
This is smaller than UT if −1 + δ (1 + β) ≥ 0, which holds given δ ≥ δFB.




































This is smaller than URS , therefore a renegotiation can never be optimal. 
Before going on, note that a termination (threat) is required to prevent renegotiation.
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If a team tried to implement such a scheme without a termination (i. e., any attempt
for renegotiation causes a change of continuation play as laid out above), this could
(and would) be subject to renegotiation as well.
In a next step, we show that such an equilibrium can also be made renegotiation-
proof with respect to off-path deviations (and be weakly or strictly renegotiation-
proof in the sense of Farrell and Maskin (1989)), implying that no subgame Pareto-
dominates another.18 In this case, free riding is not punished by a complete reversion
to individual production. Instead, the relationship enters a punishment phase. In
the punishment phase, both agents work on individual projects for a number of
periods before resuming teamwork, where however the free rider is only allowed to
exert an effort level below eI . Naturally, this also must be incentive compatible for
the free rider who always has the option to choose eI when working on an individual
project. Incentive compatibility for the free rider is achieved by a restart of the
punishment phase, which implies an additional delay before teamwork is resumed.
The number of periods with individual production is constructed such that the other,
non-deviating, agent is indifferent compared to always exerting eT in the future.
Because we do not allow for transfers, Pareto-optimality therefore does not imply
that no surplus is destroyed off the equilibrium path. The equilibrium is constructed
such that the non-deviating agent is not worse off. The free-rider, on the other hand,
is punished. Finally, note that it is of no relevance whether the punishment phase
following free-riding is carried out in the current relationship, or if it leads to a
termination with a potential new relationship starting with the punishment phase
(which still requires sufficient transparency such that new partners are aware of a
free-rider’s past behavior).
Proposition 5 For δ sufficiently high, there exists an equilibrium where eFB is im-
plemented in every period and which is renegotiation-proof in a sense that no sub-
game Pareto-dominates another subgame.
Proof of Proposition 5. We construct an equilibrium where eT = eFB is exerted
in every period (besides the first period of the game where eI is possible) on the
18According to Farrell and Maskin (1989), an equilibrium σ is weakly renegotiation-proof in the
sense of Farrell and Maskin if no continuation equilibria σ1 and σ2 exist such that σ1 strictly
Pareto-dominates σ2. It is strongly renegotiation-proof if none of its continuation equilibria is
strictly Pareto-dominated by another weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium.
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equilibrium path. After one agent has deviated by not contributing team effort eT,
the game enters a punishment phase.19 Because of renegotiation proofness, the non-
deviating agent is not worse off at the beginning of the punishment phase than on
the equilibrium path. On-path renegotiations are excluded by the strategies derived
in the proof of Proposition 4, hence we assume that the conditions needed there
are satisfied. This implies that we can also assume that a deviation by both players
triggers a termination, and play in new matches is given by the strategies derived
above. In the following, we therefore focus on unilateral deviations which involve
free-riding on the other’s effort.
It remains to show that given these requirements, there exist values of δ such that
exerting effort eT = eFB in every period is optimal. We start with constructing the
punishment phase which is started after exactly one agent exerted less than eT for
the team project.
In the punishment phase, the non-deviating agents works solely on his own project
for T > 1 periods, exerting effort eI. In period T + 1, he returns to teamwork with
probability 1− ρ and works for another period on his own with probability ρ. From
period T + 2 onwards, both agents return to teamwork forever after. T and ρ are
chosen such that the non-deviating agent’s utility in the punishment phase is the























































19Without loss of generality, we assume that punishment after a unilateral deviation happens
within a relationship and does not trigger a termination.
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Therefore, ρ and T are characterized by
−1 + δ (1 + β) = βδT+1 [1− ρ (1− δ)] . (19)
The deviating agent is only allowed to exert a reduced amount of effort on an
individual project during the punishment phase. This amount is denoted eP = αeI,
with α ≤ 1. If the deviating agent does not follow through and chooses eI instead
of eP during a punishment phase, the punishment phase starts over again.
Now the following conditions must hold: (i) It must be optimal to select eT in every
period on the equilibrium path. (ii) It must be optimal for a deviating agent to select
eP in every period of the punishment phase, and (iii) utility in the punishment phase
must not be smaller than U I – because an agent always has the option to go for
individual production.
Before we derive the respective condition, we characterize the deviating agent’s
payoff in all relevant situations. The utility of the deviating agent at the beginning
of the punishment phase equals


































Using (19), this becomes
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[−1 + δ (1 + β)] .
Deviating in the punishment phase (that is, selecting eI for one period, followed by
a re-start of the punishment phase), yields a utility of



































Using (19), this becomes
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Now, we can derive three conditions that make sure eFB can be implemented in
every period. The on-path (IC) constraint requires UT ≥ UD, which is equal to
[−1 + δ (1 + β)] ≤
β − (1− δ) (1 + β2)− δαβ (2− αβ) β
δ (1− αβ)2
. (onIC)
The off-path (IC) constraint requires UP ≥ UPD, which is equal to




Finally, UP ≥ U I and UPD ≥ U I must hold. Because of (offIC), though, only the
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second condition is relevant, which becomes
−1− β2 (2− β) +
[
αβ (2− αβ) + δ (1− αβ)2
]
(1 + β) ≥ 0.
It is our objective to find one example for such an equilibrium. Therefore, we will
show that all these conditions hold for α = 0 if δ is sufficiently large.
With α = 0, (onIC) becomes −1 ≤ (β − (1− δ) (1 + β2)) /δ − δ (1 + β). The first-
order derivative of the right-hand side with respect to δ equals (1− β + β2) /δ2 −
(1 + β), the second-order derivative −21−β+β
2
δ3
. Therefore, the right-hand side of




< 1. Since (onIC) becomes 1 + β ≤ 1 + β
for δ = 1, it also holds for δ∗. All this implies that there exists a δ̃ < δ∗ such that
(onIC) is satisfied for δ ∈ [δ̃, 1].
With α = 0, equation (offIC) becomes [−1 + δ (1 + β)] ≥ β2. This holds for δ ≥
(1 + β2) / (1 + β), with (1 + β2) / (1 + β) < 1. Finally, UPD ≥ U I becomes −1 −







Hence, we have shown that for δ sufficiently large, there exists a renegotiation-proof
equilibrium with α = 0 where eT = eFB can be implemented in every period. 
Therefore, under the conditions derived above, we are able to construct an equilib-
rium that is robust to allowing for on- as well as off-path renegotiation.
B.2 Asymmetries
Our main analysis restricts agents to be identical. In this section, we briefly present
one example of asymmetric agents. We show that an agent without self-control
problems can be part of a productive team if matched with an agent with self-control
problems – and that such a setting can be mutually beneficial.
Consider a situation with two agents i = {1, 2}, where β1 = 1 and β2 < 1. We
know from above that two agents without self-control problems cannot form a team.
A team of agents 1 and 2 is potentially feasible, though, and helps to relax the
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1 , the situation is the same
as under symmetric matching where agents without self-control problems cannot
profitably form a team). Therefore, the seemingly more diligent agent is actually
the “lazy” one who only works hard in order to not lose the other one’s goodwill.
Several effort-combinations eT1 and e
T
2 are potentially feasible. As a particular case,
suppose we want to enforce eT1 = e








– as well as eT1 = e










It can be shown that there are combinations of β2 and δ that satisfy this condition.
Given it can be enforced, such an arrangement would be preferred by both agents
compared to individual production (this is implied by the (IC) constraints). Agent
1 would naturally prefer such a match to individual production: he contributes first-
best effort, whereas agent 2’s effort is inefficiently high – hence 1’s costs are the same
as under individual production but the success probability is higher. He therefore
receives an extra rent for serving as a commitment device for agent 2. Agent 2,
on the other hand, would rather prefer to be matched with an agent who also has
self-control problems, since then the required “markup” on eFB would be lower.
B.3 Imperfect Public Monitoring
In this section, we sketch the implications of mutual monitoring being imperfect.
We show that in principle, teamwork also is feasible in this case, only the critical
threshold for the discount factor δ is larger. More precisely, we assume that in
addition to the resulting output, both agents observe a signal that gives an imper-
fect notion of exerted effort. With probability p, the signal is informative and real
41
effort is revealed; with probability 1 − p, the signal is uninformative. In the fol-
lowing, we sketch the conditions for a perfect public equilibrium (hence, strategies
only condition on publicly observable information) with which eFB can be enforced
if the relational contract is only based on the effort signal. Naturally, the relational
contract would work even better if the output realization was also used as an infor-
mative signal (then, a low output in combination with an uninformative effort signal
might optimally trigger a suspension of cooperation for a number of periods). But
this would only effectively improve the outcome if eFB could not be enforced any-
way, and a full characterization of a surplus-maximizing equilibrium with imperfect
public monitoring (which furthermore might be non-stationary) is beyond the scope
of this paper.
Now, a deviation only triggers a punishment if it is actually detected (which happens




























and the (IC) constraint for first-best effort yields the condition
δ ≥ δFB =
1− β (1− β)
[








Naturally, ∂δFB/∂p < 0. Furthermore, δFB = (1− β (1− β)) / (1− β2 (1− β)) for
p = 1 (the value derived in our benchmark case), whereas δFB = 1 for p = 0.
B.4 General Functions
In this section, we show that our results do not depend on a specific functional form
of the cost function. More precisely, we assume that total effort costs are C(et),
with C ′ > 0, C ′′ > 0, C ′′ < ∞, C(0) = 0, and lim
e→1
C(e) = ∞. Expected output still
amounts to etV and is realized in period t + 1. We keep a linear output function
because having a concave output would make it optimal to work on as many small-
scale projects as both (because marginal benefits are high for low effort levels).
But even if we imposed specific assumptions to get around this problem, having a
concave output function would not yield more generality. As long as utilities are
concave, any generality can be delivered via the cost component. Now, individual
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effort is characterized by βδV − C ′(eI) = 0, first-best effort by δV − C ′(eFB) = 0.
























In the following, we first show that Lemmas 1 and 2, as well as Proposition 1, go
through with a general cost function. Then, we derive an additional result where we
show that a smaller β might still increase team performance. First, we can confirm
Lemma 1, i. e., that forming a team is not possible if agents do not have inconsistent
time preferences.
Lemma 3 For β = 1, no positive effort level can be enforced within a team.











































< 0 for any eT.
Therefore, the left hand side of (IC) is strictly negative for any eT ≥ 0. 
Second, we show that Lemma 2 goes through as well.
Lemma 4 No effort level eT ≤ eI can be enforced within a team.
Proof of Lemma 4. Assume that eT ≤ eI. Because eI ≤ eFB and δeV −








≤ 0 for eT ≤ eI; because eI maximizes βδeV − C(e) the first line




, is strictly negative.
Therefore, the left hand side of (IC) is strictly negative for eT ≤ eI. 
Finally, we confirm Proposition 1 and show that if δ is sufficiently large, forming a
team is feasible for any β < 1 and first-best effort eFB might eventually be reached.
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Proposition 6 For every β < 1 and any effort level eT ∈ (eI, eFB], eT can be
enforced within a team if δ is sufficiently close to 1.









is strictly positive for any β < 1 and eI < eT ≤ eFB. Following Lemmas 3 and 4,
the first line of the (IC) constraint is negative, however it is bounded for any δ ≤ 1.
Hence, for δ → 1, (IC) is satisfied for any eT with eI < eT ≤ eFB. 
Finally, we show that a lower β still has two effects: On the one hand, it directly
tightens the (DE) because the future becomes less valuable. On the other hand, it
relaxes the (DE) constraint by reducing off-path individual effort levels and conse-
quently players’ outside options. Starting from β = 1 and reducing β, the second
effect initially dominates. Therefore, more severe self-control problems might actu-
ally improve performance of a team.
Proposition 7 There exists a unique βmax, with 0 < βmax < 1, that maximizes the
scope for cooperation within a team, i. e., βmax maximizes the left hand side of the
(IC) constraint for any potential team-effort eT ≤ eFB.
Proof of Proposition 7. First, note that the left hand side of the (IC) constraint
is continuously differentiable with respect to β for arbitrary values of ê. The first



















































For all eT with 0 < eT ≤ eFB, (24) is negative for β → 1 (since deI/dβ = δV/C ′′(eI) >
0 and eI → eFB), and positive for β → 0 (since deI/dβ = δV/C ′′(eI) > 0, C ′′ < ∞
and eI → 0). Because (24) is continuous in β, the left hand side of (IC) must attain
at least one global maximum for β ∈ [0, 1].
To assess the uniqueness of such a maximum, we compute the second derivative of
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δV − C ′(eI)
]
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, the second derivative of the (IC) constraint





V [3βδ − 1− δ] , (25)
where deI/dβ > 0. The term in squared brackets is negative for β < 1+δ
3δ
and positive
for β > 1+δ
3δ
, hence – as a function of β – changes its sign exactly once.
This allows us to show that the left-hand side of (IC) does not attain a local minimum








3βminδ − 1− δ
]
≥ 0.
If (25) is positive at βmin, it also must be strictly positive for all β > βmin. Therefore,
there cannot be a maximum at any β > βmin, which however would contradict that
(24) is negative for β → 1.
Because the left-hand side of (IC) must attain at least one maximum, there exists a
βmax where (24) equals zero and where (25) is non-positive. Finally, βmax is unique
because of the non-existence of a minimum. 
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